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Program with funding from Rhode Island Sea Grant. This is one of a series of fact sheets designed to highlight key concepts of state and local 
government liability risks as those governments prepare for the effects of climate change throughout New England. This fact sheet was produced 
in partnership with MIT Sea Grant and Woods Hole Sea Grant. 
1 Scope of this fact sheet 
As climate change increasingly affects homes, public infrastructure, and other developments, state 
and local governments may desire to implement novel policies and regulations to address increasing 
environmental pressures. If regulation or infrastructure management causes harm to a person, he or 
she may bring a negligence claim against the government. However, in many instances, governments 
are protected from negligence liability by sovereign immunity. 
Sovereign immunity is a legal doctrine that prevents a government from being sued without its 
consent. The Massachusetts Tort Claims Act (MTCA) waives sovereign immunity for harms caused 
by the negligent or wrongful conduct of government employees acting within the scope of their 
employment. However, the MTCA also carves out many exceptions where the government will 
remain immune from suit. This fact sheet walks through the exceptions that are likely to arise in 
climate change-related litigation, including immunity for discretionary functions, permitting 
decisions, and acts that fail to prevent harm by a third party or outside condition. 
This fact sheet will explore potential government exposure to negligence liability in the climate 
change context and answer common questions: 
• Could a municipality be liable for planning and policymaking decisions, such as deciding 
whether to upgrade a sewer system? 
• Could a municipality be liable when granting or denying a permit, such as when denying a 
building permit within a floodplain? 
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• Could a municipality be liable for its infrastructure maintenance decisions, such as ensuring 
that stormwater drainage systems are cleaned so they work as designed? 
• Could the Commonwealth be liable for disseminating or withholding flood risk information? 
2 Elements of negligence 
Negligence is one of many tort claims that can be brought by plaintiffs who have been injured by 
the actions of another. To prevail in a negligence claim, a plaintiff must prove four elements: (1) the 
defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care; (2) the defendant breached that duty; (3) the plaintiff 
suffered harm; and (4) the defendant’s breach of the duty of care was a cause of the plaintiff’s harm.1 
Failure of any one of these factors will result in the failure of a claim. In addition, even if they can 
satisfy all four factors, negligence lawsuits against state and local governments and officials may be 
barred by sovereign immunity, as described in the next section. 
The first element, establishing a duty of care, is often a contentious step in a negligence case. While 
the duty of care must be determined on a case-by-case basis, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court (SJC) has acknowledged that each person “has a duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid 
physical harm to others,” so long as the potential for harm is reasonably foreseeable.2 This duty “is 
derived from ‘existing social values and customs” and therefore changes over time.3 Negligence suits 
based on damage associated with climate change thus may become more frequent as expanding 
scientific knowledge increases our ability to foresee future harms.  
3 Sovereign immunity 
Sovereign immunity is a legal doctrine that prevents a government from being sued without its 
consent.4 This immunity has been waived in several ways under Massachusetts law. The 
Massachusetts Tort Claims Act (MTCA) waives sovereign immunity only for “injury or loss of 
property or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any 
public employee while acting within the scope of his office or employment,” unless an exception 
preserves sovereign immunity.5 A government may also impliedly waive sovereign immunity if it 
“takes on a responsibility beyond its inherent or core government functions and therefore serves in 
a capacity that could just as easily be accomplished by a nongovernmental entity.”6 For example, a 
city that agrees to serve as a trustee accepts a fiduciary duty that could be executed by a private 
person, and in doing so, the city impliedly waives its sovereign immunity with regard to its execution 
of that duty.7 
Before an allegedly wronged person may bring an action under the MTCA, that person must first 
present a written claim to the government.8 The claimant may then bring suit under the MTCA if 
the government denies the claim or fails to reach a final decision within six months.9 In addition to 
defending actions brought against itself, government entities must indemnify their public employees 
from claims when an employee “was acting within the scope of his official duties or employment.”10  
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3.1 MTCA exceptions 
The MTCA provides ten exceptions where a government retains sovereign immunity and cannot be 
sued for action that would otherwise be subject to suit under the MTCA. These exceptions include 
claims based upon: 
(a) a government actor “exercising due care in the execution of” a statute, regulation, or 
ordinance; 
(b) a government actor performing a discretionary function; 
(c) intentional torts; 
(d) tax assessment or detention of goods; 
(e) the issuance, denial, or other action on a permit application; 
(f) negligent inspection of property;11 
(g) failure to establish a fire department; 
(h) failure of police protection; 
(i) release of prisoners or other detainees; or 
(j) an act or failure to act to prevent harm.12 
The final exception (j) has its own list of limitations where a government may be sued: 
(1) if a government actor made “explicit and specific assurances” of safety;13  
(2) for claims based on “the intervention of a public employee;” 
(3) for “any claim based on negligent maintenance of public property;” or 
(4) for claims of negligent medical or therapeutic treatment.14 
This wide array of exceptions in the MTCA provide the Commonwealth and municipalities with 
defenses against many negligence actions related to climate change. 
3.2 MTCA exceptions likely to arise in climate change litigation 
A selection of the exceptions to the MTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity are particularly 
important in the context of climate change. These include: (i) the discretionary function exception; 
(ii) the permitting exception; and (iii) acts or failures to act to prevent harm. This section reviews 
how each of these exceptions may apply to government decisions related to climate change. 
Commonly known as the discretionary function exception, MTCA § 10(b) provides government 
actors with protection in many planning decisions.15 Courts use a two-prong test to determine 
whether the discretionary function exception applies. First, a court will consider “whether the 
governmental actor had any discretion at all.”16 If the actor did have discretion, the court then 
considers whether that discretion was “that kind of discretion” for which the MTCA exception is 
designed.17 Though the court will evaluate the second prong on a case-by-case basis, the general 
standard is that “planning and policymaking” decisions are entitled to immunity while 
“implementation and execution” of those policies are not entitled to immunity.18  
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The SJC’s analysis in Shapiro v. City of Worcester provides insight into the use of the discretionary 
function exception.19 The plaintiffs filed suit against the city when sewer infrastructure repeatedly 
backed up onto their properties.20 The city had entered into an agreement that allowed additional use 
of the sewer system with plans to redesign the system to accommodate that load, but the system was 
never redesigned.21 Therefore, the plaintiffs brought suit alleging that the city had foreseen the 
potential for overloading the sewer and had allowed the increased load without taking action to 
address the risk, which resulted in harm to the plaintiffs.22 The SJC held that the discretionary 
function exception did not apply because the city had already used its discretion to create a plan to 
expand the sewer system, and the failure to execute that plan was not a discretionary function.23 
Thus, while the discretionary function exception commonly shields many decisions related to coastal 
management, inadequate implementation of management decisions may result in liability. 
Another MTCA exception highly relevant in the climate change context is § 10(e), granting 
immunity for “any claim based upon the issuance, denial, suspension or revocation or failure or 
refusal to issue, deny, suspend or revoke any permit, license, certificate, approval, order or similar 
authorization.”24 This provision has been broadly interpreted in granting sovereign immunity to 
claims arising from granting, denying, or failing to issue various permits and other authorizations.25 
In Woods v. Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection, the plaintiffs brought a claim when the 
Department issued permits to private landowners to construct shoreline protection structures that 
resulted in erosion of the plaintiffs’ property.26 The Superior Court held that the plaintiffs could not 
bring tort claims against the Department because the claims were based upon the Department’s 
decisions in issuing or denying permits and therefore barred by § 10(e).27 Decisions about whether to 
grant, deny, or condition permits for coastal activities therefore will not result in liability absent 
some other ground for a lawsuit.  
Third, MTCA § 10(j), commonly known as the statutory public duty rule, provides immunity for: 
any claim based on an act or failure to act to prevent or diminish the harmful 
consequences of a condition or situation, including the violent or tortious conduct of 
a third person, which is not originally caused by the public employer or any other 
person acting on behalf of the public employer.28 
This provision provides immunity when a government fails to prevent harm caused by a third party 
or natural condition.29 Courts have reasoned that “[i]t is almost impossible to imagine an injury that 
could not have been prevented,” so the government should not be held liable for every injury that it 
could have acted to prevent.30 In Jacome v. Commonwealth, for example, the court held that the 
Commonwealth was entitled to immunity under § 10(j) when the plaintiff’s son drowned at a public 
beach.31 The court observed that “it was the conditions in the water” that caused the decedent to 
drown, not any affirmative act by the beach staff, despite the possibility that alternative actions by 
beach staff might have kept the son from drowning.32  
As noted above, the MTCA provides limitations to the statutory public duty rule, two of which may 
prove relevant to climate change-related litigation: assurance of safety and negligent maintenance of 
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public property. In order for these exceptions to apply, the government actor must have been an 
“original cause of harm,” meaning the government actor must have actually contributed to the harm 
and not merely failed to prevent it.33 The Appeals Court of Massachusetts held that expanding the 
exceptions in § 10(j) more broadly would allow the exceptions to “encompass the remotest 
causation” and undermine the purpose of § 10(j) entirely.34 
The exception for assurance of safety “requires that ‘explicit’ and ‘specific’ assurances of safety, 
beyond general representations, be made by” a public employee.35 The assurance cannot be implied 
from conduct but must be expressly spoken or written.36 To be “specific,” the assurance “‘must be 
definite, fixed, and free from ambiguity.’”37 By its own terms, § 10(j)(1)’s exception for specific 
assurances does not include permit language. 
Finally, the MTCA provides that a government entity can be liable for negligent maintenance of 
public property.38 The Appeals Court of Massachusetts noted that this provision would not apply to 
claims for failure to construct infrastructure.39 However, a government entity must exercise 
reasonable care in constructing and maintaining public property and may face liability for failure to 
“maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition.”40 In Canterbury Automotive, Inc. v. City of 
Worcester, the plaintiff brought suit alleging that the city had improperly designed and negligently 
maintained its sewer and drainage system, resulting in flooding and damage on plaintiff’s property 
after Tropical Storm Hanna.41 Although the court granted the city’s motion for summary judgment 
because the plaintiff had failed to present sufficient evidence to support its claim, the court observed 
that the MTCA does not immunize a city from inadequate maintenance of its sewer system.42 
4 Common negligence claim topics in the climate change 
context 
The Commonwealth or local governments could face negligence claims if they fail to consider the 
effects of climate change or underestimate those effects in drafting their local plans, granting 
permits, maintaining infrastructure, and more. They could also risk suit for overestimating the 
effects of climate change, although these claims are likely to be in the form of takings as the harm 
will manifest as deprivation of property rights or value. Takings claims in the climate change context 
are beyond the scope of this fact sheet, but a fact sheet providing a full discussion of such takings 
claims is available.43 This section reviews how negligence and sovereign immunity may apply to 
commonly-asked questions about government actions related to climate change. 
4.1 Planning and policymaking 
Climate change may require a variety of planning and policymaking activities, such as how to address 
changing patterns of precipitation in water systems and other government-owned infrastructure or 
decisions about whether and how to allow coastal development. As in many other jurisdictions, 
Massachusetts courts have recognized that the MTCA provides sovereign immunity for many of 
these planning and policymaking decisions through the discretionary function exception. Decisions 
involving “weighing alternatives and making choices” that involve a significant level of discretion are 
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more likely to be found to qualify for immunity.44 The SJC considered this provision in Shapiro v. City 
of Worcester, where the plaintiffs brought suit against the city because an inadequate sewer system 
caused backups onto the plaintiffs’ properties during storm events.45 Although the SJC held that the 
discretionary function exception did not apply to the city’s failure to execute the sewer expansion 
plan, the court noted that the initial decision to expand the sewer was “that kind of discretion for 
which § 10(b)” was created.46 Similarly, the Massachusetts Superior Court found the town was 
entitled to immunity in Diloreto v. Town of Winchester when town employees had to allocate limited 
resources during a severe storm and prioritized other actions over opening a storm drain near 
plaintiff’s property, which resulted in flooding of plaintiff’s property.47 The court held that resource 
allocation is a public policy decision entitled to immunity under the discretionary function 
exception.48 These cases suggest Massachusetts courts may find that municipalities are immune from 
suit in creating management plans and setting policies in response to sea level rise and other climate 
change impacts. 
4.2 Permitting 
A person harmed by a government actor’s issuance or failure to issue a permit or other authorization 
could seek redress from that government.49 However, the MTCA grants multiple avenues of 
immunity from such cases. Section 10(e) expressly grants immunity for permitting, licensing, and 
similar decisions. Additionally, courts have held that permitting decisions are entitled to sovereign 
immunity under the discretionary function exception.50 Finally, MTCA § 10(j)(1) expressly states that 
language in permits and certificates cannot qualify as an express assurance of safety. In light of these 
three provisions, a Massachusetts court is unlikely to allow a negligence suit based upon the issuance 
or denial of a permit. As a result, these cases are most often brought for other forms of relief, such 
as by alleging violations of the underlying ordinance or state land use law. 
4.3 Failure to maintain infrastructure51 
In Massachusetts, governments have an obligation to maintain their infrastructure in functional 
condition.52 Decisions on building or altering infrastructure may fall under the discretionary function 
exception, allowing the government to avoid liability.53 However, execution of planning decisions, 
once made, as well as maintaining existing infrastructure in good repair are non-discretionary, as 
shown in Shapiro. Governments therefore will not be immune to claims of negligence if their failure 
to maintain or execute policy decisions results in damage to persons or property.54 
4.4 Dissemination or withholding of flood risk information 
Government entities could face lawsuits if their employees disseminate incorrect flood risk 
information. Property owners who under- or over-prepare their properties for flood impacts or 
owners whose property values decrease due to projected flood risks might seek relief for the costs 
they endure for reliance on government information. However, a Massachusetts court may find that 
the government is entitled to immunity because the broad dissemination of information is akin to a 
planning practice.55 However, a claimant may be able to overcome sovereign immunity if a 
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government actor made “specific assurances of safety” from flooding that proved incorrect.56 
However, as discussed above, such assurances would need to be express and specific.57 
Alternatively, governments may face negligence claims for failing to disseminate flood risk 
information. Massachusetts courts recognize causes of action for failure to warn of dangers in suits 
between private parties, including for failure to warn of flooding risks.58 However, courts have noted 
the importance of using a different standard for government actors in order to balance “[t]wo 
‘equally important’ purposes…‘to allow plaintiffs with valid causes of action to recover in negligence 
against governmental entities…[and] to preserve the stability and effectiveness of government’” 
without fear of endless litigation.59  
Two exceptions within the MTCA may insulate a government for its decision not to disseminate 
flood risk information. Like an affirmative decision to disseminate information, a court may view a 
decision to withhold information as a policy-level decision and therefore find it immune under the 
discretionary function exception.60 Under MTCA § 10(j), a government entity may be entitled to 
immunity because flooding harm is caused by a natural condition, such as the ocean, and 
withholding risk information does not directly contribute to the harm.61 The Massachusetts 
Appellate Court’s treatment of this provision in Jacome v. Commonwealth supports the theory that a 
court may find immunity for a government in future cases where harm results from natural causes. 
Although the SJC has not directly spoken directly to the scope of the §10(j) exception for climate-
related natural harms and each case will be decided on its unique facts, the overall treatment of the 
MTCA exceptions suggests that a government entity is unlikely to be liable for choosing not to 
disseminate flood risk information, so long as that choice was based on a discretionary decision 
process.62 
5 Conclusion 
Massachusetts’ state and municipal government negligence liability for coastal management in light 
of climate change is limited by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. However, the Commonwealth 
and its municipal governments could still face claims for negligent maintenance of public 
infrastructure, express assurances of safety made by government actors, or negligent implementation 
or execution of policies. Consultation with local counsel will be critical to minimize the risk of 
liability for government action addressing flooding and other climate change effects. 
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